Estimating Potential Social Losses from Market Failure: Oil Exploration in Alberta
估算加拿大阿尔伯塔省彩虹-扎马地区石油勘探市场失灵造成的潜在社会损失，发现无产权或税收时损失达潜在租金的80%，有税收时约30%，且实际钻探模式与有税收的非合作模型吻合。
This article presents estimates of the potential social losses caused by market failure in oil exploration in the Rainbow-Zama region of Alberta. We construct models that predict exploratory drilling for noncooperative Nash equilibrium with and without taxes, and for the social optimum. In the absence of appropriate property rights or taxes, estimated losses are of the order of 80% of potential rents. With taxes, estimated losses are of the order of 30%. We show that actual drilling resembles that predicted by the noncooperative model with taxes rather than by the optimal model. This indicates that the land tenure system in Alberta did not effectively ameliorate the market failure not eliminated by taxation.