Managerial Power and Succession: SBU Managers of Mutual Funds
研究了共同基金部门经理的继任前因，发现任期、控制收入比例、管理层进出和杠杆率对继任有显著影响，并调节了绩效与继任的关系。
This study applies the performance-power-succession model to the analysis of the antecedents of succession among SBU managers. We hypothesize that six socio-political factors unique to the SBU manager role will have major effects on succession and will also moderate the performance-succession relationship. Data gathered on portfolio managers of open-ended mutual funds shows the main effects of tenure, portion of revenues controlled, managerial exits and entries, and leverage on succession, but reveals no support for market share. Mediating effects were found for tenure, portion of revenues controlled, market share, leverage, and managerial exits, but not for managerial entries. We discuss the implications of these findings for extending the literature on executive succession to include SBU managers.