Wages, Prices and Politics: Evidence from Norway
利用挪威时间序列数据，研究中央工会与社会民主党之间的紧密联系对工资的影响。估计结果显示，从资产阶级政府转向社会民主党政府会使制造业长期工资下降2.3%，并通过溢出效应使私人服务业工资下降约2%。
This paper studies the empirical relevance of the close ties between a central trade union and the social democratic political party using time series data for Norway. Using a structural wage‐price model we estimate that changing from a bourgeois to a social democratic government reduces manufacturing wages in the long run by 2.3 percent. This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of the union leaders. Private service wages are not directly affected by government type, but wage spillover effects imply that the long‐run dampening effect in the private service sector is around 2 percent. The results also support the proposition of the Scandinavian model of inflation that the traded goods sector is the wage leader.