The Value of Information about Product Quality
研究消费者和垄断厂商对产品质量不确定时，公共信息对双方福利的影响，发现厂商总是偏好更多信息，但消费者可能因成本函数特性（如规模报酬递增或边际成本凸性）而受损。
Both consumers and a monopolist producer are uncertain about a good's quality. I derive conditions under which the value of public information about quality will be positive or negative to consumers and the firm. I find that the firm always prefers more information, but consumers may not. I identify two properties of cost functions which lead to a negative value of information for consumers: increasing returns to scale and sufficiently convex marginal costs. If, however, demand and cost functions are linear, then consumers always prefer more information. I also analyze the aggregate value of information and extensions to nonmonopolistic markets.