The Spread of Aggressive Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Shelter
研究了企业通过董事会连锁关系等社会网络因素如何影响其采用企业拥有的人寿保险避税工具，发现网络联系增加了采用可能性，地理因素影响较弱，但审计公司和行业集中度无显著影响。
ABSTRACT: This study investigates the spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting by modeling a firm’s decision to adopt the corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) shelter. Prior studies identify firm characteristics associated with aggressive tax reporting (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Frank et al. 2009) and tax shelter participation (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). This study examines whether social environment factors explain the pattern of tax shelter adoption. Building on theory related to the diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism, I hypothesize direct and indirect ties between prior and potential shelter adopters influence the spread of shelter use. I find that network ties via board interlocks increase the likelihood of adopting the COLI shelter. I also find weak evidence that COLI use spreads geographically. However, I find no evidence that the spread of COLI use is concentrated among a particular set of audit firms or industries.