Board Characteristics, Managerial Incentives, and the Choice Between Foreign Acquisitions and International Joint Ventures
基于代理理论和公司治理文献，研究了董事会特征和管理层激励如何影响企业进入外国市场时选择收购还是合资企业，发现外部董事比例高、独立领导结构以及管理层股权和长期薪酬激励更强的企业更倾向于收购。
Drawing on the agency theory, corporate governance, and international business literatures, the authors link board characteristics and managerial incentives to the choice between acquisitions and joint ventures by firms entering foreign markets. Hypothesized relationships are examined in the context of 383 acquisition and 171 joint venture entries undertaken by relatively nondiversified firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector during the period 1991 to 1999. Findings indicate that firms with boards characterized by a higher proportion of outside directors and independent leadership structures (i.e., the absence of duality) are more inclined to favor acquisitions over joint ventures in foreign market entry. Likewise, the data reveal that firms where insiders have greater equity ownership and compensation structures that are more closely linked to long-term firm performance prefer acquisitions over joint ventures. Implications of the findings along with directions for future research are discussed.