Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade
用战略性贸易政策理论解释17世纪重商主义，以英荷东印度贸易之争为例，分析垄断特许状中的管理激励如何帮助荷兰取得斯塔克尔伯格领导地位，并用1620年数据检验其他政策效果。
This paper interprets seventeenth-century mercantilism, when international trade was conducted chiefly by state-chartered monopoly trading companies, in light of recent theories of strategic trade policy. The Anglo-Dutch rivalry for the East India trade illustrates a case in which the profit-shifting motive for strategic trade policies exists. Dutch supremacy in the early East India trade was facilitated by a managerial incentive scheme in the monopoly charter that enabled it to achieve a Stackelberg leadership position. Data from the East India trade around 1620 are used in a Cournot duopoly model to examine the possible effects of other policies. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.