Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements
研究当企业主和风险厌恶的管理者双方努力都不可验证、利润也不可验证时，企业主通过赋予管理者以预先约定价格买断企业的期权，可以无成本地完全解决双重道德风险问题。
We consider a double moral hazard problem in which the efforts of two parties, e.g., a principal who initially owns an enterprise and a risk averse agent in the enterprise, are not verifiable.The realized value of the enterprise's random profit stream is also unverifiable.There is also no third party to break a "balanced budget" requirement.Nevertheless, the double moral hazard problem can be resolved completely and costlessly when the principal, who can observe the agent's actions, has the option of requiring the agent to purchase the enterprise at a prenegotiated price.