CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS
通过分析1984至1988年间185家公司的六种反收购条款采纳情况，发现机构投资者在有机会投票时会行使投票权，且直接股东控制与管理者持股之间存在替代关系。
This paper advances understanding of corporate governance relationships with a longitudinal study of multiple antitakeover options. Prior analyses have been primarily cross-sectional, focused exclusively on a single provision ignoring provisions which require subsequent stockholder approval. The current study uses agency theory, and broadens this perspective by examining the differential impact of institutional investors stockholding, managerial stock ownership, and corporate board characteristics on the rate of adoption of six provisions, including provisions which do and do not require stockholder approval. Results of hazard analyses of the rate of amendment adoption of 185 firms between 1984 and 1988 indicate that the impact of governance variables on antitakeover provisions differ depending on whether these actions require stockholder approval or not. The pattern of differences indicates that institutional investors use their voting power when they are given an opportunity to vote and that substitution between direct shareholder control and managerial stock ownership exists.