Open-Market Repurchase Announcements and Stock Price Behavior in Inefficient Markets
研究为何公司在股价因回购公告上涨后仍选择回购股票，提出非有效市场中的信号均衡模型，预测长期正回报和公告正效应。
I ask why a firm would choose to buy back its outstanding shares after the stock price goes up in response to an open-market repurchase announcement. I introduce the subject of market inefficiency and establish a signaling equilibrium that does not assume that an announcement of open-market repurchase represents a commitment. Since the firm can earn capital gains by buying its outstanding shares at a bargain price, it has a strong incentive to execute stock repurchases even after it announces repurchase intention. Empirically, my model predicts positive long-run stock return performance and positive announcement effects following open-market repurchase announcements.