Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
研究包含不可分割商品和货币的交换模型，证明强核与竞争分配集总是相等，并通过例子说明两者可能严格包含于核中甚至消失。
The author considers an exchange model with indivisible goods and a perfectly divisible good, namely, money. This model was presented by M. Quinzii (1984) as an extension of the Shapley-Scarf model without divisible goods. The author proves that the strong core always coincides with the set of competitive allocations. Two examples show that these two sets can be strictly included in the core and, in an extreme case, disappear while the core still exists. Such phenomena do not occur under an indispensability assumption on money. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.