Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results
通过实验研究协调博弈中的均衡选择，发现纳什均衡能预测玩家策略，但帕累托最优均衡不一定被选中，且改变劣势策略的收益会影响均衡选择。
We study the selection of an equilibrium for coordination games: symmetric, simultaneous move, complete information games which have multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. We design and experiment to explore regularities in the observed outcomes for this class of games. With replication, we find that the Nash equilibrium concept accurately predicts the strategies chosen by players in these games. However, the equilibrium outcome is not always the Pareto-dominant equilibrium so that coordination failures can arise. Moreover, we find that altering the payoffs of a dominated strategy can influence the selection of a Nash equilibrium. Our results are consistent with a modified version of Harsanyi's tracing procedure in which players initially place some positive probability that their opponent is a cooperative player even though the cooperative strategy may be dominated by another strategy.