Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
研究在实时支付过程中，具有永久约束力协议的联盟形成问题，证明在特征函数博弈中均衡过程收敛于有效吸收状态，但存在四玩家博弈中所有马尔可夫均衡均无效的情况。
We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are history dependent—must converge to efficient absorbing states. For three-player games with externalities each player has enough veto power that a general efficiency result can be established. However, there exist four-player games in which all Markov equilibria are inefficient from every initial condition, despite the ability to write permanently binding agreements. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.