Information, Certification and Demand for Food Safety: Evidence from an In‐store Experiment in Mumbai
通过在印度孟买进行店内实验，研究发现向消费者提供食品安全认证信息能显著提高其购买认证葡萄的意愿，表明信息不足而非支付能力是制约安全食品需求的关键。
Abstract Is demand for safe food in developing countries low because of limited ability to pay, or because of lack of consumer awareness and absence of credible certification? To answer this question we conducted a controlled market experiment in Mumbai, India, selling grapes with credible certification labels alongside unlabeled grapes while providing randomly selected consumers with information on salient features of food safety certification. We confirm that informed consumers are more likely to purchase labeled grapes, controlling for prior information and attitudes, and using two (intensive versus extensive) information treatments. Policies related to information/certification could be an important component of improving public health by mobilising latent demand for food safety and hence supply of safer food for the public.