On the Inefficiency of Two-Part Tariffs
指出，即使允许对消费者收取不同的固定费用，两部收费制在一般均衡下仍可能无法实现帕累托效率，且仅靠征税弥补亏损也无法达到效率。
The partial equilibrium literature on two-part tariffs suggests that if a commodity is produced under increasing returns, efficiency can be achieved through marginal cost pricing and a suitable choice of "entry fees" (fixed charge) which may vary from consumer to consumer. We show that this partial equilibrium intuition cannot be extended beyond some special cases. Even with a consumer-specific fixed charge, it is possible that none of the equilibria yield Pareto efficiency. Furthermore, it may be impossible to achieve Pareto efficiency through any specification of taxes which are levied solely to cover losses.