Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation
研究会计政策及审计在盈余管理中的作用，通过一个两期代理模型分析代理人私下观察行动和产出、初始合同可重新谈判的摩擦，发现信息配给是有效的，并可解释为会计政策经审计执行的结果。
We emphasize the role of accounting policies, and their audit, in an earnings management setting. We use a two–period agency in which three frictions interact: the agent privately observes action (or effort) supply and output, and the initial contract is subject to renegotiation. This creates a setting in which both players’ behavior is of concern, and, importantly, information rationing is efficient. Moreover, this information rationing is directly interpretable as being produced by an accounting policy whose application is ensured by an auditor.