Producer Price Risk and Quality Measurement
研究农产品行业中，风险规避的种植者面临的价格风险如何与质量衡量不完善导致的道德风险问题相互作用，发现有效合同不会让种植者完全免受价格风险。
Abstract Risk‐averse farmers in the produce industry grow a product whose market price is often quite unpredictable. Shippers or other intermediaries shield the farmer from much of this price risk; however, actual contracts between growers and shippers vary considerably across commodities in the residual price risk growers face. We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement results in a moral hazard problem, and that price provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, an efficient contract does not shield growers from all idiosyncratic price risk. We examine this hypothesis for the case of fresh‐market tomatoes.