Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts
研究内在动机如何影响最优激励合同，发现静态合同不受内在动机影响，但隐性合同利润随内在动机增强而增加，表明两者互补。
I study the role of intrinsic motivation on optimal incentive contracts. Agents engage in efforts to generate projects with both financial return and intrinsic value to the agent. In a neutral environment, where intrinsic motivation has no direct effect on the disutility of effort, static contracts are unaffected by intrinsic motivation. In contrast, the firm's profits from an implicit contract are increasing in the degree to which the agent is intrinsically motivated, showing that implicit contracts and intrinsic motivation are complements. The results are further extended to consider the role of multiple implicit contracts and product market strategy.