Another Look at the Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs
质疑Alexander(1994)关于1930年代《国家工业复兴法》下公平竞争法规改变关键集中度的发现，使用共同行业样本未检测到制度转换，且法规对价格-成本边际无显著影响，表明法规不足以克服卡特尔形成成本。
Alexander's (1994) finding that the National Recovery Administration's Codes of Fair Competition led to a change in the critical concentration level during the 1930s is questioned. No regime switch is detected when a common industry sample is employed. Also, when industries with and without codes are analyzed, codes appear to have no effect on price–cost margins during the period. This absence of effect is postulated to be a result of the unenforceability of trade practice provisions contained in many codes. The empirical results of this paper suggest that the existence of codes was not sufficient to enable industries to overcome cartel formation costs. Only easily enforceable trade practice provisions appear to have affected the structure–performance relation in the period following repeal of the National Industrial Recovery Act.