Fair Income Tax
在个体技能和偏好异质性的模型中，基于效率和公平原则及激励相容约束，推导出评价所得税表的简单标准：低收入区间最高平均税率越低越好，最优税应对工作穷人（低技能、高劳动时间者）给予最大补贴。
In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure, we look for the optimal tax on the basis of efficiency and fairness principles and under incentive-compatibility constraints. The fairness principles considered here are: (1) a weak version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle; (2) a condition precluding redistribution when all agents have the same skills. With such principles we construct and justify specific social preferences and derive a simple criterion for the evaluation of income tax schedules. Namely, the lower the greatest average tax rate over the range of low incomes, the better. We show that, as a consequence, the optimal tax should give the greatest subsidies to the working poor (the agents having the lowest skill and choosing the largest labour time).