Does Earnings Management Affect Firms’ Investment Decisions?
研究操纵财务报告的企业是否做出次优投资决策，发现被SEC调查、股东起诉或重述报表的企业在操纵期间过度投资，之后恢复正常，说明盈余管理也会影响内部决策。
ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.