DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*
构建了一个在职工人搜寻工作、企业通过工资和就业概率引导搜寻的劳动力市场模型，解释了同质工人和岗位间工资差异的形成，以及工人如何逐级攀登工资阶梯。
We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.