Capacity, Entry, and Forward Induction
在Dixit（1980）的产能与进入模型中引入可避免固定成本，产生多重进入后均衡的协调问题。通过剔除弱占优策略，进入者可采用大产能承诺的“击倒策略”驱逐在位者，而在位者则需以“柔道战术”缩减产能应对。研究表明，当可避免固定成本足够高时，在位者只能接受小于进入者的市场份额，甚至退出市场。
We introduce avoidable fixed costs into the capacity and entry model of Dixit (1980) to produce a coordination problem among multiple postentry equilibria. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies makes it possible for the entrant to play a knockout strategy, consisting of a large capacity commitment which selects the entrant's preferred postentry equilibrium and drives the incumbent from the market. The incumbent must respond to the knockout threat by using judo tactics, involving a reduction in its capacity commitment. In subgame perfect equilibria which are robust to elimination of weakly dominated strategies, the incumbent must accept a market share smaller than the entrant's if avoidable fixed costs are sufficiently high, or cede the market to the entrant if avoidable fixed costs are higher still.