A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting
构建了一个国会投票的一般均衡模型，同时考虑议员、选民和竞选捐款者的行为，并用八项经济监管法案的唱名投票数据检验模型，发现非经济因素、工会和企业的捐款以及意识形态都会影响投票。
In this paper we specify a model in which Congressmen, constituents, and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior. Constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of Congressmen; Congressmen, on the other hand, want to be elected and vote accordingly. We empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model. Our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of Congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors. We also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential; unions are more often influential than is business. Ideological factors are also important in explaining voting.