Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments
研究一般化敲竹杠模型，证明若将重新谈判建模为无限期非合作博弈，则简单初始合约通常存在有效均衡，该合约不依赖模型细节，通过赋予一方定价权、另一方无到期期权来实施有效投资。
This paper studies a general model of holdup in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modeled as an infinite-horizon noncooperative bargaining game, then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract is robust in the sense that it does not depend on fine details of the model. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms of trade and gives the other party a nonexpiring option to trade at these terms. The difference from standard results arises because the initial contract ensures that the renegotiation game has multiple equilibria; the multiplicity of continuation equilibria can be used to enforce efficient investment. Copyright Copyright 2008 by The Econometric Society.