Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge
研究研发竞赛中领先者向落后者披露阶段性研究知识的讨价还价问题，分析许可费方案如何影响效率与剩余分配，发现不知情的买方能实现完全披露而不分享增量剩余。
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate,patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the'amount of knowledge disclosed', by the leading to the laggingagent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In hersequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee.