Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli
分析两个经济主体（如个人、社会机构与客户或组织内单位）因利他关切而产生的策略互动，指出这种共同关切可能导致社会低效和搭便车，并简要讨论强制社保或软预算约束如何缓解此问题。
This paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal interaction between two economic agents who have "overlapping" concerns, such as altruistic concerns for each other's welfare. The agents may be two individuals, a social bureau and a client, or two units in an organization. The authors show how the presence of such common concerns may lead to socially inefficient outcomes, in which one economic agent "free rides" on the other's concerns. They also brief ly discuss how this inefficiency and free riding, in the context of interaction between individuals, might be mitigated by compulsory social security systems. As another example, the authors interpret th e inefficiency in terms of Janos Kornai's "soft budget constraints" within organizations. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.