Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
用投票购买模型分析宪法特征如何影响立法机构的内部组织，发现总统否决权和两院制会促使立法机构设立内部否决者或超级多数规则，而一院制则鼓励将权力委托给领导人。
Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures, we adopt a vote-buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers. We show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules, while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader.