Robustness and Linear Contracts
研究了委托人对代理人可能采取的行动存在不确定性时，如何设计稳健的契约，发现最优契约是线性的，为实践中常见的线性契约提供了新解释。
We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance, over unknown actions the agent might potentially take. The model assumes risk-neutrality and limited liability, and no other functional form assumptions. Very generally, the optimal contract is linear. The model thus offers a new explanation for linear contracts in practice. It also introduces a flexible modeling approach for moral hazard under nonquantifiable uncertainty.