声誉与产品质量

Reputation and Product Quality

RAND Journal of Economics · 1984
被引 467
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究竞争市场中产品质量不可观察时声誉的作用,发现存在价格等于平均成本但高于边际成本的均衡,且企业不降价是因为降价会激励生产低质量产品,消费者也预期到这一点。

Abstract

This article considers the role of reputation in a competitive market where product quality is unobservable. It is shown, among other things, that there can exist equilibria where price is equal to average cost but greater than marginal cost. No. firm cuts its price because this would make it more profitable to produce low- rather than high-quality goods; consumers are aware of this and would not buy its products.

声誉产品质量竞争市场均衡价格