A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
研究玩家在阶段博弈中可能不同时行动的重复序贯博弈，提出了有效最小最大值概念，并证明了当玩家足够耐心时，任何高于该值的可行收益向量都能被子博弈完美均衡支持。
We study repeated sequential games where players may not move simultaneously in stage games. We introduce the concept of effective minimax for sequential games and establish a Folk theorem for repeated sequential games. The Folk theorem asserts that any feasible payoff vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax value in a sequential stage game can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding repeated sequential game when players are sufficiently patient. The results of this paper generalize those of Wen (1994), and of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The model of repeated sequential games and the concept of effective minimax provide an alternative view to the Anti-Folk theorem of Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) for asynchronously repeated pure coordination games. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.