Debt‐for‐Equity Swaps under a Rational Expectations Equilibrium
分析发展中国家债转股在理性预期均衡下的可行性，发现完全信息下各方不会偏好此交易，信息不对称下出现逆向柠檬市场，只有贷款定价准确反映私有信息时交易才可能发生。
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes LDC debt‐for‐equity swaps under a rational expectations equilibrium. Under full information, the swap can never be strictly preferred by the LDC, the MNC, and the bank. Under the postulated informational asymmetry assumptions the same results obtain, leading to the “lemons” market in reverse. Under rational expectations, the swap can only occur if the loan is correctly valued relative to all private information in the economy. Given that some swaps do occur, future models must reflect the unique features of swaps.