Strikes as the Random Enforcement of Asymmetric Information Contracts
构建了一个两状态罢工模型，企业家和工人随机选择行为，企业家在坏状态下要求降薪，工人有时同意有时威胁罢工，罢工仅在坏状态下执行，该均衡可能帕累托优于标准非对称信息合同模型。
A two-state model of strikes in which both the entrepreneur and the worker randomize their behavior is developed. The entrepreneur always asks for a wage reduction unaccompanied by a cut in labor services if the state is bad and he sometimes makes the same request in the good state. The worker sometimes agrees to this request and sometimes threatens to strike. The strike threat is only carried out in the bad state. This equilibrium can Pareto dominate that found in the standard asymmetric information contracting model. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.