Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption‐Controlling Device
分析为何富人的高消费难以揭示腐败，导致委托人倾向选择穷人作为代理人，并讨论如何通过选择代理人和监控消费来减少腐败。
There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered when investigating levels of consumption that appear to be hard to justify. The informativeness of an agent's level of consumption depends on his legal income and initial level of wealth, as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal's belief about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they are easier to monitor. More generally, we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.