Bank Mergers and Diversification: Implications for Competition Policy
分析风险规避型银行的合并与竞争，发现贷款需求与存款供给冲击的相关性导致市场两侧战略依存，多元化动机强时合并可提升借贷双方福利，但存款者冲击相关性更高时其福利受损更重。
Abstract This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.