Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
研究在个体拥有相互支付相关的私人信息时，如何设计仅依赖公共信息的激励方案，使得期望行为成为贝叶斯均衡，并给出了存在性条件。
Individuals have or observe partly private information. They independently choose acts, possibly including messages. The center may also act. Individuals' utilities may depend on all acts and information, including others' private information. Are there incentives depending only on public information that make desired behavior a Bayesian equilibrium? Assume incentive payments are separable and fully transferable. Appropriate incentives exisit either if the center's information depends stochastically, however slightly, on all relevant private information, or if individuals' relative valuations of acts, however divergent, are not too dissimilarly affected by different states of nature. More generally, one gives necessary and sufficient conditions for existence whenever the strategy profile asks agents to reveal all private knowledge relevant to their beliefs about the center's information