The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure
研究私立非营利医院提供慈善医疗服务的动机，发现若慈善供给的收入效应不大，医院偏好凸性会导致其他医院或政府医院的慈善服务被挤出；引入不纯利他主义（竞争）可解释为何挤出效应和收入效应常较弱。马里兰州医院数据支持慈善供给存在竞争。
This article studies provision of charity care by private, nonprofit hospitals. We demonstrate that in the absence of large positive income effects on charity care supply, convex preferences for the nonprofit hospital imply crowding out by other private or government hospitals. Extending our model to include impure altruism (rivalry) provides a possible explanation for the previously reported empirical result that both crowding out and income effects on indigent care supply are often weak or insignificant. Empirical analysis of data for hospitals in Maryland provides evidence of rivalry on the supply of charity care.