Why Do African Banks Lend So Little?
用理论模型和非洲银行面板数据，发现道德风险和逆向选择导致信贷市场不发达，而制度质量低时贷款违约是抑制放贷的主因，但达到阈值后改善不再有效。
Abstract We put forward a plausible explanation of African banking sector under‐development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Using an appropriately modified Industrial Organization model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse selection (a lack of good projects). Applying a dynamic panel estimator to a large sample of African banks, we show that loan defaults are a major factor inhibiting bank lending when institutional quality is low. We also find that once a threshold level of institutional quality has been reached, improvements in the default rate or institutional quality do not matter. This provides support for our theoretical predictions.