CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective
研究了304家台湾上市公司中CEO的任期，发现家族企业CEO更替率显著更低且与业绩负相关，代理理论适用于非家族企业但不适用于家族企业。
This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled, 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.