Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker– De Groot–Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets
发现BDM机制在引出卖方保留价格时对随机买断价格的上限敏感，实际中难以普遍激励相容，并提出了两种设定上限的方法使其均值与激励相容市场无差异。
The Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism is used in experimental economics as an incentive‐compatible procedure for eliciting reservation prices. It is found here, where seller prices are elicited, that the mechanism is sensitive to the choice of upper bound of the randomly generated buyout prices. Hence, the mechanism cannot be generally incentive compatible in practice. Two ways to specify the upper bound are identified which make the BDM mechanism yield mean seller prices that do not differ from those generated in an incentive‐compatible market. The experimental market used here is designed so that traders are unable to influence transaction prices, even when the market is small.