Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test
利用意大利1994-2001年两层级选举中候选人同时参选但必须接受多数席位的规则，通过窄胜选举比较发现，多数制代表更倾向于提出针对选区的法案且缺勤率更低，验证了多数制减少租金、增加定向再分配的理论。
Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994–2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin, we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues.