Serial Cost Sharing
针对固定群体共享递减收益技术时的成本分摊问题，提出并分析了序列成本分摊方法，证明其在凸单调偏好下具有占优可解性且唯一纳什均衡抗联盟偏离，并指出其他平滑机制无法在所有偏好下实现唯一均衡。
The authors consider the problem of cost sharing in the case of a fixed group of agents sharing a one input, one output technology with decreasing returns. They introduce and analyze the serial cost sharing method. Among agents endowed with convex and monotonic preferences, serial cost sharing is dominance solvable and its unique Nash equilibrium is also robust to coalitional deviations. The authors show that no other smooth cost sharing mechanism yields a unique Nash equilibrium at all preference profiles. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.