Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation
研究采购中买方可以拆分合同给多个供应商的拍卖机制，发现拆分合同均衡兼具合谋特征和成本效率，且从上游投资角度看买方可能偏好拆分合同而非赢家通吃。
In many procurement settings, it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers. In this article, we develop a model of split-award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous. We characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing agents in an environment in which suppliers are fully informed about each other's costs. Split-award equilibria simultaneously exhibit strong collusive features and cost-efficiency properties. Despite the former property of the equilibria, upstream investment considerations may lead a buyer to prefer a split-award auction format to a winner-take-all auction format.