INSTITUTIONAL TRAPS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
认为低质量制度、政治经济权力集中与欠发达会长期持续，通过模型分析民主化如何作为承诺机制提升制度质量、促进增长，并展示两种发展路径。
This article's point of departure is that low‐quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low‐quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high‐quality institutions, and faster growth.