Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts
研究蒙特利尔除雪合同拍卖中企业因地理位置不同导致的成本不对称，发现靠近市中心的企业因设备存储成本高而具有成本优势，并评估了不对称带来的效率损失及政策效果。
Differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procurement auctions. Relying on a structural approach, this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in Montréal. The empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of Montréal because of prohibitive equipment storage costs. The extent of inefficiency due to asymmetry is empirically assessed. Various policy experiments are performed. A bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.