Regulation by Price Adjustment
针对Vogelsang和Finsinger提出的规制价格调整过程易受被规制企业策略操纵的问题，提出若干改进方案，通过引入垄断特许权市场及企业历史价格和收益约束，确保企业高效生产并收敛至拉姆齐价格。
The regulatory price-adjustment process originally proposed by Vogelsang and Finsinger has been shown to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the regulated firm. This article proposes several modifications to that scheme which improve its performance and broaden its applicability. Inclusion of a monopoly franchise market and the firm's past prices and earnings in the price-adjustment constraints are shown to ensure efficient production by the firm and convergence to Ramsey prices regardless of the firm's cost structure.