Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency
研究轮转储蓄与信贷协会（一种全球常见的民间金融组织）的资金分配效率，比较随机分配和竞标两种方式与正规信贷市场及理想效率的差距，发现两种方式均非高效，但随机分配在某些情况下能给参与者带来比信贷市场更高的预期效用。
This paper examines the allocative performance of rotating savings and credit associations (roscas), a financial institution which is observed world-wide. We develop a model in which individuals save for an indivisible good and study roscas which distribute funds using random allocation and bidding. The allocations achieved by the two types of rosca are compared with that achieved by a credit market and with efficient allocations more generally. We find that neither type of rosca is efficient and that individuals are better off with a credit market than a bidding rosca. Nonetheless, a random rosca may sometimes yield a higher level of ex ante expected utility to prospective participants than would a credit market.