How Anti-Merger Laws can Reduce Investment, Help Producers, and Hurt Consumers
研究发现，当资本降低边际成本且拥有更多资本的企业在并购谈判中获得更大份额时，并购后的均衡价格可能低于无并购情况；若进入受限，禁止并购可能提高行业利润减去投资成本，因此允许并购的监管环境可能损害企业而有利于消费者。
If capital lowers marginal cost and a firm with more capital gets a bigger share of the surplus in merger bargaining, then the equilibrium price with a merger may be lower than without a merger. If entry is restricted, the level of industry profits minus investment costs may be higher if mergers are prohibited. Thus, a regulatory climate that permits mergers may harm firms and benefit consumers. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.