The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Industry
研究汽车运输行业监管是否创造垄断租金，以及租金归谁所有。通过股价对放松监管的反应，发现监管创造了垄断利润，部分租金归企业所有者，工会化、运营效率和服务特征影响放松监管对股价的作用。
This article focuses on two questions in the debate over motor carrier regulation. First, did regulation create, eliminate, or have no effect on monopoly rents in the trucking industry? Second, ifthere were rents, what was their incidence: were they received by owners oftrucking firms, dissipated through higher costs, or captured by the Teamsters union? Data on share price responses to deregulation announcements reveal declines in expected profits of 8-19% of totalfirm value. This suggests that regulation created monopoly profits, and indicates that at least some of these rents accrued to owners of trucking firms. Firms' responses to regulatory change are modelled as functions of company's operating characteristics, and measures of unionization, operating efficiency, and service characteristics are shown to affect the impact of deregulation on share values.