A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered Species Act Amendments
从公共选择视角分析美国国会就《濒危物种法案》修正案的投票行为，发现议员的投票受党派、意识形态及本州濒危物种数量、城市人口比例、自然资源和建筑业产值占比等因素影响。
Abstract Public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market. Interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers. The lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group, thereby maximizing their rent from the political market. This article examines Endangered Species Act (ESA) amendments from a public choice perspective. Congressional voting on the ESA amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology. The results show that the lawmakers' voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation, ideology, and several characteristics of their home state, such as number of endangered species, proportion of urban population, contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product, and geographical location